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INTRODUCTION

President Bush has made homeownership a central element of his hous
2
ing policy.' Through the American Dream Down Payment Act, the
Homeowner's Tax Credit, and the Zero Downpayment Mortgage Initiative,
President Bush is attempting to make homeownership easier both by reduc
ing the down payment required and by increasing financing options for the

*

J.D. May 2006. I would like to thank Professors Michael Barr and Nina Mendelson as
well as the entire Volume 104 Notes Office for their willingness to read and comment on earlier
versions of this Note.
I.
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Increasing Affordable Housing and Expand
ing Homeownership (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/
09/20040902-5.html [hereinafter Expanding Homeownership].

2.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12821 (West 2005).
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purchase of a home.3 More Americans owned homes in 2004 than ever be
4
fore. This increase in homeownership has allowed more families to enjoy
the "security, dignity, and independence that comes with owning their piece
5
of the American drearn."
Homeownership is particularly important because of the numerous bene
fits it provides. It is one of the few vehicles through which low-income and
6
minority families can accumulate capital. For this reason, it can provide a
7
multigenerational path out of poverty. Not only do homeowners accumulate
wealth that can be passed on to the next generation, homeownership increases
8
psychological and physical well-being, self-esteem, and social capital. Chil
dren of homeowners are not only more likely to own homes themselves, but
are also more likely to graduate from high school and college, are less likely
to become pregnant while teenagers, are more likely to have greater future
earnings, and are more likely to be involved in civic affairs.9

3.
During the first six months of 2004, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) devoted $161.5 million to helping low-income, first-time homebuyers with down payments.
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET SUMMARY 7 (Feb. 7, 2005),
http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy06/fy06budget.pdf.
4. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey-Historical Table 14, http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/histt14.html (last visited May 28, 2006); U.S.
Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership-Annual 2004: table 20, http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual04/ann04t20.html (last visited May 9, 2006).
_
Expanding Homeownership, supra note I.
5.
6. Julie Kosterlitz, Home Sweet Home?, 36 NAT'L J. 712 (Mar. 6, 2004) (" '(P]aying off the
mortgage on a home has been, and will continue to be, the easiest way for [low-income and minor
ity] households to build personal wealth."'(quoting Stephen Brobeck)); Bruce Katz et al.,
Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice (The
Brookings Inst. & The Urban Inst., Discussion Paper, Dec. 2003) [hereinafter Brookings, Housing
Policy] ("Housing wealth accounts for a vast majority of total assets for low-income and minority
homeowners. "). For example, for homeowners with household incomes below $20,000, homeown
ership accounts for seventy-two percent of net household wealth. For homeowners with incomes
between $20,000 and $49,000 , home equity constitutes fifty-five percent of total wealth. NICOLAS P.
RETSINAS & ERIC s. BELSKY, Low-INCOME OWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 201
(2002). Although some raise concerns that low-income households are more likely to be harmed by
depreciations in home equity, e.g., Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble: A Ttme Bomb in Low-Income
Communities?, NAT'L HOUSING INST., May-June 2004, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/135/
bubble.html, the limited research available shows that low-price homes are more likely than expen
sive homes to increase in value and less likely to decrease in value. RETSINAS & BE LSKY, supra, at
203-05.
7. Kosterlitz, supra note 6, at 714 ("[S]ome people see tackling racial disparities in home
ownership as the next front in the battle for racial equality. 'The racial wealth gap is the starkest
lever of racial inequality and is transmitted from one generation to the next.' " (quoting Thomas M.
Shapiro)).
8. Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 58-59. Although some of the studies attrib
uting these benefits to homeownership are open to criticism on grounds that they may blur
correlation and causation, low-income homeowners themselves attribute improvements in their lives
to homeownership. William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Effects of Homeownership on the
Self-Esteem, Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of Low-Income People, 60 J. AM. PLAN. Ass' N
173, 180 (2004) (finding that eight-five percent of low-income homeowners said that "owning a
home made them feel better " and that seventy-one percent said that homeownership gave them
"increased control over their lives ").
9. Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 59; see also Kosterlitz, supra note 6. Al
though homeownership in poor neighborhoods may produce fewer benefits, recent research shows
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Through much of this nation's history, however, blacks have been sub

ject to a host of discriminatory practices in the housing market. Realtors
refused to show blacks homes in white neighborhoods. Lenders refused
mortgages on the basis of race or the racial composition of neighborhoods.
When blacks did succeed in buying homes, their investments often depreci
ated because realtors used blockbusting to increase housing
10
temporarily in neighborhoods transitioning from white to black.

prices

In response to such discriminatory practices, Congress enacted the Fair
'1
Congress

Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (FHA).

recognized that widespread racial discrimination in the housing market was
preventing integration and interfering with minority access to jobs and qual
12
ity education. Spurred by the race riots in the late 1960s, Congress looked
1
to the FHA to ease the tension resulting from racial isolation. 3 Through the
FHA, Congress hoped "to eliminate the discriminatory business practices

which might prevent a person economically able to do so from purchasing a
1
house regardless of his race." 4
Despite the many successes of the FHA, homeownership rates among
blacks continue to lag behind those of whites; non-Hispanic whites are half
15
again as likely as blacks to own their homes. The unavailability of home
owners insurance in black neighborhoods contributes to the gap in
16
homeownership rates. Lenders refuse to write mortgages on uninsured

property for fear of risking a destruction of their collateral simultaneous
with a reduction of the borrower's resources and capacity for repayment.
7
Insurers have been reluctant to write policies in black neighborhoods.'

When insurance is available, blacks pay more per dollar of insurance than

that homeownership in almost any neighborhood will benefit children. Brookings, Housing Policy,
supra note 6, at 60. In fact, children of renters may be better off if their parents purchase homes in
distressed neighborhoods than if they remain renters and move to better neighborhoods. Id.
10.
Blockbusting occurs when realtors sell homes to black families in a white neighborhood
in such a way as to create a panic among the white residents. GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR Hous1NG
COMES OF AGE 88 (1988). White residents leave the neighborhood and blacks, who are willing to
pay extra to live in an integrated neighborhood, purchase the homes for a premium. Id. The resulting
turnover in homes benefits realtors by increasing prices and sales. Id.
11.

114 CONG. REc. 2276, 2281 (1968).

12.

Id. at 2273.

13.
Charles L. Nier, ill, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617, 628-30
(1999).
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dunn
14.
v. Midwestern lndem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 ( S.D. Ohio 1979)).
15.
Oversight of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Including the Depart
ment's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2005: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of Alphonso Jackson, Secretary, United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development).
16.

See PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS,
see also

MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES (1968) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL];

Cisneros, 52 F.3d at 1360 ("[T]he availability of property insurance has a direct and immediate
affect on a person's ability to obtain housing.").
17.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992).
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The available data indicate

that these premiums exceed those necessary to cover higher losses in black
1
neighborhoods. 9
Insurers use a wide range of practices which contribute to the pricing
differential in insurance for whites and blacks. For example, insurance com
panies typically establish a maximum age for houses beyond which policies
20
become more expensive or entirely unavailable. Since a disproportionate
21
number of blacks live in older homes, this results in making insurance un
available or more expensive for this population.

Similarly, insurance companies consider the market value of a home in
deciding whether to underwrite it and in deciding what type of policy to
22
provide at what rate. For example, insurers often establish a minimum
23
value threshold below which insurance is unavailable. Because low-income
minorities need to buy inexpensive homes, and since insurance is necessary
to secure a loan, minimum-value requirements operate to prevent poor peo
ple from buying homes. Insurers who do offer to cover inexpensive homes
usually charge higher rates and refuse to write insurance for the entire re24

placement cost of the home.

Insurance companies also adjust premiums by neighborhood in a way

that increases prices in low-income, minority areas. Although insurance
companies no longer draw red lines around minority neighborhoods to mark
25
off areas where they will not underwrite policies, they accomplish similar
results by cleaving territory based in part on crime rates, the percentage of
owner-occupied homes in the neighborhood, the number of vacant buildings
in the neighborhood, and the response time of the fire and police depart
26
ments.
Insurance companies fail to market insurance in low-income,
27
28
minority areas and charge higher rates per dollar of insurance. As a result,

18.

See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.

19.

Id.

20. Robert R. Detlefsen, Risk-Based Homeowners Insurance under Siege: The Slippery
Slope from Redlining Charges to Disparate Impact Claims 11 (Nov. 1997), available at
http://www.cei.org/pdf/1509.pdf.
21. Gregory D. Squires, Race, Politics, and the Law: Recurring Themes in the Insurance
Redlining Debate, in INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 11 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997).
22. This information comes from informal conversations with agents at State Farm, American Family, Allstate, and Farmers Insurance companies.
23.

Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 13.

24.

Id.

25. This practice is known as "redlining." See, e.g.,
978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).

NAACP

v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,

26.

Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 11-14.

27.

See, e.g., L. H. Otis, Availability Woes Documented in Pa., 101 NAT'L UNDERWRITER:
Sept. 15, 1997, at 3.

PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT.,

28.

L. H. Otis, New Evidence of Urban Insurance Gap Released, 99 NAT'L UNDERWRITER:
June 26, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Otis, Urban Gap].

PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT.,
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insurance companies typically have lower loss-to-premium ratios in minor
ity neighborhoods than in others.29

Finally, insurance companies use subjective criteria, such as requiring

that the insured " 'be a

erson of integrity and financial stability who takes
E
pride in his property.' " This language has been likened to "code words"
used to exclude black customers in the era of overt redlining.31 Subjective

criteria provide a vehicle for insurance agents to exercise their own biases.

This Note argues that because homeowners insurance is central to

homeownership, the FHA applies to insurance underwriting policies, such
as those mentioned above, that have a disparate impact on minority potential
homeowners. Part I considers whether the FHA applies to homeowners in

surance and concludes that homeowners insurance is covered by the Act.
Part II goes on to argue that the FHA applies to homeowners insurance even
where the discrimination results from disparate impact, rather than from
disparate treatment. Finally, Part III analyzes the above-mentioned policies

of the insurance industry under the FHA disparate impact standard.
I . APPLICATION OF THE FHA TO INSURANCE

Although courts have disagreed about whether the FHA applies to
homeowners insurance, the great weight of authority supports its applica

tion.32 Section I.A analyzes the language of the FHA and concludes that it
applies to insurance. Section l.B examines the legislative history and deter
mines that applying the Act to insurance comports with congressional intent.
Section LC presents the alternative argument that, even if the FHA does not
expressly apply to insurance, courts should give deference to the Depart
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulation forbidding
discrimination in insurance under the FHA. Finally, Section l.D determines
that application of the FHA to insurance is consistent with state control of
the insurance industry.

29. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. Recently, some insurance companies
have replaced consideration of these factors with consideration of past loss rates from the neighbor
hood. Supra note 22. To the extent that the above factors are predictive of risk, using loss rates by
neighborhood will continue to result in insurance costing more in poor, urban areas, but may mini
mize differences in loss ratios.
30. Squires, supra note 21, at 6 (quoting a 1993 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
underwriting manual).
31.

Id.

32. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995), NAACP v.
Am Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992), Nat'I Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002), Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
94 Ohio Misc. 2d 151 (Ohio C.P. 1997), and Dunn v. Midwestern lndem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co.,
472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979), with Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir.
1984).
.

.,

1998
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A. Statutory Interpretation
The language of the FHA should be interpreted to include homeowners
insurance. Although insurance is not explicitly mentioned in the Act, the
broad language of both§ 3604 and§ 3605 logically covers insurance.
Under§ 3604(a), it is unlawful to do anything that makes a dwelling "un
33
available." Because insurance is required in order to qualify for a mortgage,
and since most people need a mortgage in order to buy a home, discrimination
in underwriting decisions or in insurance pricing can make a dwelling un
3
available, in contravention of§ 3604. 4
35
Although it could be argued that "otherwise make unavailable or deny"
should only apply to activities similar to the refusal to sell or rent a home, not
to all activities that make housing unavailable, this reading is inconsistent with
other § 3604 jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has found that the FHA
36
should be read broadly. Courts have readily applied § 3604 to a number of
37
activities beyond the actual sale or rental transaction, such as zoning, the
38
construction of low-income housing, and the provision of Section 8 housing
39
vouchers.
Most courts have agreed that insurance, like zoning, is covered by § 3604.
The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that, under the canon of
40
ejusdem generis, the FHA must be interpreted to exclude insurance. That
court found a "direct connection of availability of property insurance and abil
ity to purchase a house," which makes insurance discrimination the kind of
discrimination banned by the FHA.41 The Seventh Circuit agreed that banning

33.

Section 3604 states, in relevant part:

it shall be unlawful(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

(b) To discriminate against any person in the tenns, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (emphasis added).
34. As Judge Easterbrook put it, "no insurance, no loan; no Joan, no house." Am Family, 978
F.2d at 297.
35.

42 u.s.c. § 3604 (2000).

36. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); see also Michigan Prot &
Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Congress intended§ 3604 to reach a
broad range of activities that have the effect of denying housing opportunities to a member of a pro
tected class.").
37.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977).

38.

Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).

39.

Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (I st Cir. 2000).

40.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1357-58 (6th Cir. 1995).

41. Id. at 1359 (deferring to HUD's interpretation of the FHA as applying to insurance as
promulgated in 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005)) (citing Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire &
Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979)).
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insurance discrimination forwards the FHA's goal of "removing obstacles to
42
Only the Fourth Circuit has disputed that
43
this language applies to homeowners insurance. Various district courts have

minorities' ownership of housing."

also held that this language applies to insurance, both in the context of race
44
and in the context of underwriting hazard and li
45
ability insurance for mental health group homes.

based insurance redlining

Although most courts have analyzed insurance under § 3604, insurance
also falls within the language of § 3605. Section 3605 makes it unlawful to
46
discriminate in lending or in "providing other financial assistance." Since
insurance is a prerequisite for obtaining a loan, the ban on discrimination in
lending is meaningless if insurance discrimination is left unchecked. Thus,
insurance is an integral part of the "residential real estate-related transactions"
covered by § 3605 and logically falls within the scope of "financial assis
47

tance" mentioned in that section.

The fact that insurance discrimination is a financial service within the
scope of§ 3605, however, does not mean that it is not also within the scope of
49
48
§ 3604. Statutory provisions commonly overlap, and, as explained above,
insurance discrimination does function to "make unavailable or deny" hous
ing within the scope of § 3604. Courts have analyzed other financial

42.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992).

43.

Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1984).

44.

Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1109.

45. See Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) (applying the FHA to property
insurance for group homes for the mentally retarded); Nevels v. W. World Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d
1110, 1117-22 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (extending the reasoning in earlier cases to apply the FHA to an
insurer's refusal to provide liability insurance for group homes for the mentally disabled).
46.

Section 3605 states, in relevant part:

(a) In general
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential
real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a
transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
(b) "Residential real estate-related transaction" defined

As used in this section, the term "residential real estate-related transaction" means any of the fol
lowing:
(1) The making or purchasing of loans or providing otherfinancial assistance-

(A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling . . .
42 U.S.C.§ 3605 (2000) (emphasis added).
47. Id. This conclusion was reached by the court in National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc.
Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica, 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2002).

v.

48. Insurers have argued that because § 3605 covers specific financial services, the phrases
"otherwise make unavailable " and "discriminate . . . in the provision of services " in § 3604 cannot be
interpreted to refer to financial services. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 423. Because insurance is a financial
service, and not explicitly mentioned in § 3605, it must be beyond the Act entirely. Id. The Fourth
Circuit adopted this view in Mackey. Id.
49.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992).

2000
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services arguably covered under § 3605, such as Section 8 housing vouch
50
ers, under§ 3604.
B. Legislative History and Purpose of the FHA
The legislative history of the FHA demonstrates that applying the Act to
insurance promotes Congress's policy goals. The purpose of the FHA, as
expressed in the legislative history, is to prevent all discrimination relating
to housing. The link between insurance and the purchase of a home puts
insurance discrimination squarely within that purpose.
Through the FHA, Congress intended to make a broad statement against
51
discrimination while "leaving details to the future." Congress made no at
tempt to specify all the services that would be covered by the Act. For
example, the "Questions and Answers" document, used in the Senate, ex
plains that the "Act will cover brokers, property owners, managers and
52
anyone else who participates in the sale, rental or financing of housing."
Similarly, as a result of negotiations in the Senate, the language of § 3605 in
53
the final Act was broadened, making it unlawful not only to "deny a loan"
54
but also to deny "other financial assistance." In introducing the Bill, one
sponsor explained that it would "eliminate the discriminatory business prac
55
tices" that affect homeownership. He did not mention any limits on the
56
types of businesses affected.
It is not surprising that insurance is not discussed in the FHA or its legis
57
lative history. The Fourth Circuit in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Co.
reached the contrary conclusion that, because the insurance industry needs
to be free to make decisions based on risk, Congress would have explicitly
considered the needs of the insurance industry if it had intended the FHA to
58
apply to insurance. The debates on the FHA, however, focused on the so
cial problems created by housing discrimination, not on the policies through
59
which such discrimination manifests. In introducing the Bill, its sponsors
spoke extensively about the abysmal conditions in the "rotting cores of cen
62
61
60
tral cities," such as inferior schools and the unavailability of jobs, but
v.

Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (I st.Cir. 2000).

50.

Langlois

51.

Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 299.

52.

114 CONG. REc. 2272 (1968) (emphasis added).

53.

Id. at 2270.

54.

Id. at 4572.

55.

Id. at 2275.

56.

Id.

57.

724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).

58.

Id. at 423.

59.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992).

60.

114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968).

61.

Id. at 2273.

62.

See, e. g. , id. at 2282.
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did not discuss specific housing practices that contributed to the problems.

63

The only specific practice mentioned a t all was blockbusting, which is ex
64
pressly prohibited by the Act. Throughout the debates, the Senate focused
65
66
on housing quality and overcrowding in inner-city, minority areas. Sena
tors also argued that the Act could address concerns regarding the high price
67
of housing in low-income, minority areas as well as racial differentials in
68
homeownership rates. Insurance discrimination contributes to high costs
69
and urban underinvestment, making it the type of discrimination that Con
gress was attempting to address through the FHA.
It could be argued that, in passing the FHA, Congress intended to rem
edy inner-city conditions only by making it possible for minorities to exit
these areas, not by making financing available to those who remain in the
inner city. Congress was very concerned with protecting minorities' rights to
70
move to white neighborhoods. However, the supporters of the Act referred
71
repeatedly to "choice" in housing. This must include the choice to invest in
72
a home in the inner city, in addition to the choice to leave.
That some members of Congress tried unsuccessfully

to pass an

amendment to the FHA to include insurance explicitly does not indicate that
73
Congress did not intend the FHA to apply to insurance. The amendment
was introduced by one of the original sponsors of the FHA, seeking to clar
74
Its sponsor

ify the meaning of the bill in response to the Mackey decision.
63.

See id. at 227�1.

64.

42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2000).

65. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 2526 (1968) (speaking of the goal of "a decent home . . . for
every American family "); id. at 2528 ("[H]ousing of nonwhite families is consistently of poorer
quality than that of white households of the same income level . . . In 1960, [forty-four] percent of
all nonwhites lived in substandard housing as compared to [thirteen] percent of white families. ").
66.

See, e.g., id. at 2530, 2281.

67. Id. at 2528 ("[N]onwhites-whatever their income-pay higher prices for lower quality
housing than white families. "); id. at 2540 ("[T]here is a growing number of Negro Americans who
are able to buy good housing, but who find that so much of their purchasing power is absorbed by
exorbitant real estate costs in the ghetto . . . . ").
68. Id. at 2529 (noting that rates of homeownership remain lower for nonwhites than for
whites at every income level).
69.

ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 16.

70. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REc. 2274 (1968) ("[H]ousing discrimination . . . tell[s] the Negro
citizen trapped in an urban slum there is no escape, that even were he able to get a decent education
and a good job, he would still not have the freedom other Americans enjoy to choose where he and
his family will live. ").
71. See, e.g., id. at 2283, 2524, 2998; Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Commerce and Finance, 90th Cong. 6 (1967) (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att'y Gen. of
the United States).
72. This was recognized by the Second Circuit in banning racial quotas designed to maintain
integrated communities by preventing white flight. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d
1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Section 3604 'is designed to ensure that no one is denied the right to
live where they choose for discriminatory reasons. '" (quoting Southend Neighborhood Improve
ment Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984))).
73.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 299 (7th Cir. 1992).

74.

132 CONG. REC. 848 (1986).
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emphasized that the Act had always been intended to apply to all "links" in
75
the "real estate chain," including homeowners insurance. The amendment
was discussed only briefly in the Senate and never came up for a floor
76
vote. The failure of legislation under these circumstances is likely unre
77
lated to its merits The Seventh Circuit considered this question and agreed
.
that the failure of this amendment should not be considered determinative of
1s
.
l mtent.
.
Congress1ona
That Congress passed the Urban Property Insurance Protection and Re
insurance Act (UPIPRA) of 1968 the same year it enacted the FHA similarly
does not imply that the FHA should not be interpreted to apply to insur
79
ance. Although the passage of insurance-related legislation the same year
as the FHA might support an inference that Congress intended to handle
insurance problems outside of the FHA, UPIPRA does not address the same
issues as the FHA. The purpose of UPIPRA was to provide a subsidy to in
surers in order to "protect private insurance companies from the risk of
80
catastrophic losses which resulted from riots or civil disorders." UPIPRA
81
did not address discrimination, the central goal of the FHA. Thus, the first
court to consider the question determined that insurance redlining is the
82
"especial province of the Fair Housing Act."
C. Deference to HUD 's Interpretation
Even if a court does not agree that the FHA clearly applies to insurance
discrimination, courts should defer to HUD's interpretation, as expressed in
83
24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4). Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re
sources Defense Council, Inc. ,84 courts defer to agency interpretations of
their enabling statutes where (1) Congress has not "directly spoken to the
precise question at issue" and (2) the "agency's answer is based on a per
85
missible construction of the statute."
75.

Id.

76.

See id.

77. See, e. g., Order of R. R. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 528 (1947). This is particu
larly true where the failed legislation reflects an attempt to clarify an agency's jurisdiction. See, e. g.,
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United
States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968).
78.

Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 300.

79.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1358 (6th Cir. 1995).

Id. at 1358 (quoting Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp.
80.
1106, 1111 (S.D. Ohio 1979)).
81.

Id.

82.

Dunn,

472 F. Supp. at 1112.

83. The HUD regulation makes it illegal to "[r]efus[e] to provide . . . property or hazard
insurance for dwellings or providing such . . . insurance differently because of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. " 24 C.F. R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005).
84.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

85. Id. at 842-43. Although later decisions have somewhat limited the reach of the Chevron
doctrine, they have not affected the application of the Chevron doctrine to rules, such as the HUD
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Application of the FHA to insurance clearly survives the first prong of
the Chevron test. According to the Chevron Court, the traditional tools of
statutory construction should be used to determine whether Congress has
s6
directly spoken to the question. As explained in Sections l.A-B, Congress
has not directly spoken to the applicability of the FHA to homeowners ins1
surance.
Under the second prong of the Chevron test, courts should defer to HUD's
ss
reasonable interpretation of the statute as applying to insurance. HUD's in
terpretation is reasonable, as required under the second step of Chevron,
because it is a possible interpretation of the language and forwards the pur
s9
pose of the Act. The Sixth Circuit explicitly considered this question and
concluded that HUD's interpretation is reasonable "in light of the direct con
nection of availability of property insurance and ability to purchase a house"
90
and given the broad purpose of the FHA. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the
application of the FHA to insurance forwards the goals of the Act and found
that "[n]othing in the text of the statute permits us to reject these proposed
91
readings." The Fourth Circuit's ruling that the FHA does not apply to insur
ance was issued prior to the promulgation of 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) and
92
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron.
The consistency of HUD's position on the application of the FHA to in
93
surance discrimination further indicates that deference is appropriate. On the
basis of its expertise, HUD has consistently interpreted the FHA to cover in
94
surance since the 1970's.
HUD promulgated a regulation explicitly

regulation at issue here, that were promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking procedures.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (denying Chevron deference to informal
agency adjudication but preserving deference for notice and comment rules); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000 ) (denying Chevron deference to interpretive rules); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (denying Chevron deference to agency interpreta
tions in legal briefs).
86.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.

87. If anything, Congress has indicated that the FHA does ban discrimination in homeowners
insurance. See supra Sections l.A-B.
88.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1992).

89. See Barnart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (relying primarily on the text of the Act
to determine if the agency interpretation was reasonable); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704--05 (1995) (relying on the legislative history and purpose of the
statute, in addition to the text, to uphold the agency interpretation under of the Act); see also supra
Sections 1.A-B (arguing that the language and purpose of the Act indicate that it should be read to
apply to insurance).
90. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (citing Dunn v. Midwestern
lndem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 1979)).
91.

Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 298.

92.

See generally Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).

93. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (considering consistency of the
agency position as one factor indicative of the amount of weight that should be given to an agency
interpretation).
94.

Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 299-300.
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forbidding insurance discrimination under the FHA in 1989, less than a year
95
after receiving rulemaking authority.
HUD's expertise lends further credibility to its consistent determination
that insurance discrimination can make housing unavailable. HUD has sig
96
nificant expertise in the issue of housing discrimination. Courts have
recognized HUD's expertise when deferring to the agency's interpretations
97
and decisions in other contexts. These cases give HUD considerable dis
cretion to implement the varied and often competing goals of the national
98
housing policy. Congress has also indicated its trust in HUD's expertise by
delegating responsibility for interpretation of the FHA to HUD through its
99
use of such broad language in the Act and by amending the FHA to give
100
HUD rulemaking authority and increased enforcement powers. Given the
consistency of HUD's position, the highly complex regulatory scheme of the
FHA, the broad powers the Act confers on the agency, and the tremendous
101
complexity of issues of residential segregation, HUD's determination that
12
the FHA applies to insurance should carry great weight. 0

95. This regulation makes it illegal to "(r]efus[e] to provide . . . property or hazard insurance
for dwellings or providing such . . . insurance differently because of race, color, religion, sex, handi
cap, familial status, or national origin." 24 C.F.R. § I00.70(d)(4) (2005). The regulation was
promulgated on January 23, 1989. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3232 (Jan. 23, 1989).
96. HUD is a well-established agency that has existed since 1965 and administers dozens of
housing-related programs. HUD's History, http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl 8/hudhistory.cfm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005). For a list of programs, see HUD Programs, http://www.hud.gov/
funds/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). For a discussion of the relevance of these factors in
weighing the Agency's interpretation, see Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (noting that agencies deserve addi
tional deference where "'specialized experience and broader investigations and information' [are]
available to the agency " (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944))); Aluminum
Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 387 (1984).
97. Alschuler v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 481-87 (7th Cir. 1982) (defer
ring to HUD informal adjudication regarding the location of housing under the Section 8 program);
Capitol Mortgage Bankers, Inc. v. Cuomo, 222 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2000) (deferring to HUD's inter
pretation of its authority in the area of mortgage lending).
98.

See, e.g., Alschuler, 686 F.2d at 481-487.

99. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 ("When Congress has 'explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the stat
ute by regulation,' and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective,
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute." (quoting Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat'! Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984))). Congress intended to delegate
this type of broad authority to HUD. One Senator criticized the FHA during the floor debate be
cause it "empower[ed] the Secretary of HUD to do virtually everything." 114 CONG. REc. 2538
(1968).
100. Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3612, 3614 (2005); Mead, 533 U.S.
at 226--27 (holding that an administrative interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference when "Con
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law," which can
be demonstrated by a grant of the "power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rule
making," and the agency's interpretation is an exercise of that power).
101.

See, e.g., STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LoNG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DooR: SEG
11 (2000).

REGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS

102. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (considering these factors as indicative of the amount of
weight that should be given to an agency interpretation).
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D. Impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
on the Interpretation of the FHA
Insurance companies turn to the McCarran-Ferguson Act to argue that
1
the FHA cannot be interpreted to apply to insurance. 03 The McCarran
Ferguson Act provides that federal law does not preempt state insurance law
unless the federal law "specifically relates" to insurance.104 Federal law not
specifically relating to insurance should not be interpreted to "invalidate,
15
impair, or supersede" state insurance law. 0 Some argue that, under McCar
ran-Ferguson, the FHA cannot be applied to insurance because it does not
explicitly mention insurance and would preempt States' determinations of
106
appropriate insurance discrimination regulations.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted to handle conflicts between
17
state insurance regulations and federal antitrust laws, 0 and it should not be
interpreted as invalidating subsequent civil rights laws. The Act was passed
in 1945, in response to the Supreme Court's determination that insurance
18
could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. 0 Congress wanted to "pre
serve the traditional role of the states in the taxation and regulation of the
business of insurance" and to exempt insurance companies from antitrust
109
laws. Congress did not intend to exempt insurance companies from civil
11
rights legislation. 0 The Act's reference to the "business" of insurance and,

103. This argument has been raised in every major insurance discrimination case. See, e.g.,
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2003); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
978 F.2d 287, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1992).
104.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:

(a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub
ject to the Jaws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super
sede any Jaw enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the busi
ness of insurance . . . .
1 5 U.S.C.A. § 1012 (West 2005).
105.

Id. § 1012(b).

106.

Almost every state has laws or regulations limiting discrimination in insurance. However,

most of these regulations are much narrower than the FHA. Rosemary Baptiste et al., Redlining,
Property Insurance and Urban Markets: Concepts, Issues, Initiatives, and Solutions, 49 Soc'y
CHARTERED PROP. & CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS 82, 96-102 (1996). State laws typically prohibit
"unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class or between neighborhoods within a
municipality and of essentially the same hazard. " See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § J 0-3-1104(1)(1)(11)

(2004). Since insurance companies argue that wealthier, white neighborhoods do not represent the
same level of hazard as poor, minority neighborhoods, these laws do not reach most discrimination
in homeowners insurance.
107.

Am. Family, 978 F.2d at 294.

108.

United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

109.

Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1984).

l JO.

Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1065 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on

other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983).

Michigan Law Review

2006

specifically, to "fee[s] or tax[es]"

111

[Vol. 104:1993

demonstrates the Congressional focus

on financial, not social, regulation of insurance companies.
Even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act is applied to civil rights legislation,
federal law does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state law unless it
112
explicitly conflicts with an express provision of state law.
Every circuit
court that has considered this issue has held that federal anti-discrimination
113
laws do not conflict with state insurance laws.
These cases typically re
quire that the insurance company "point to" a particular law that would be
114
invalidated, impaired, or superseded. The existence of a "general regula
tory

scheme"

does

not

preclude

the

application of

a

federal

anti

discrimination law, even where the federal law provides additional reme
115
dies.
That the application of the FHA could affect insurance prices and
interfere with states' control over prices does not mean that the state law is
116
Therefore, unless a particular state law allows insurers to dis

invalidated.

criminate contrary to the FHA, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FHA DISPARATE
IMPACT STANDARD TO INSURANCE

In addition to banning disparate treatment in the insurance business, the
FHA should also be interpreted to forbid insurance policies with a disparate
impact that are not justified by business necessity. Section II.A defines the
disparate impact test used in FHA litigation not relating to insurance. Sec
tion 11.B considers the applicability of that test to insurance. Section 11.C
argues that, as part of the showing of business necessity, the insurer should
bear the burden of showing the lack of a less discriminatory alternative.
A. Disparate Impact under the FHA
While no appellate court has considered the application of the FHA to
disparate impact insurance claims, the FHA does apply to disparate impact
claims in contexts other than insurance. Eleven circuit courts have consid
ered this question, and all agreed that disparate impact claims are viable

111.

15 U.S.C.A.§ 1012 (West 2005).

112.

See, e.g., Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 295-97 (5th Cir. 2003).

113. Id. at 299; Moore v. Liberty Nat'I Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2001)
(considering preemption of§ 1981 and§ 1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d
1351, 1363 (6th Cir. 1995); Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d
1486, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering preemption of RICO); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992); Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421.
114.

Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 297.

115.

Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421.

116. Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 297 n.5. But see McClain v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., No. 97-1139CV-W-FJG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34662, at *19-20 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2005) (holding that the
court should not issue an order that would alter insurance rates approved by the state commission, in
part because the commissioner considered discrimination in approving rates).
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111

Although the D.C. Circuit has not ruled on this point, it
118
and D .C. District Court
119
The Supreme
j udges have held that the FHA applies to disparate impact.
under the ·FHA.

has indicated its agreement with the other circuits,

Court has construed similar language in Title VII to apply to disparate im
1 20
pact. The Court also remanded Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan H ousing

Development Corp. 1

21

for consideration of FHA claims after finding that

22

there was no discriminatory intent. 1
Although there is some confusion regarding the appropriate test to apply
123
to disparate impact cases under the FHA,
a test derived from Title VII ju

risprudence is appropriate in the FHA context. Under this test, in order to
show a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must ( 1) show that
a disparate impact exists, (2) identify a policy alleged to have caused the
124
disparate impact, and (3) show that the policy caused the disparate impact.
If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
125
the defendant to show that the policy is justified by a business necessity.

117. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Mountain
Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51 (10th Cir.
1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Supe
rior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Starrett City
Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482-84 (9th Cir. 1988);
Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d
1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1978); Resi
dent Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill.
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508
F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974).
118.

Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 790 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

119. See, e.g., Nat') Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d
46, 58-59 (D.D.C. 2002).
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (construing the phrase "because of
race, " which also appears in the FHA).
121.

429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977).

122. The Supreme Court has continued to leave open the question of disparate impact under
the FHA after a number of courts ruled in favor of a disparate impact test. City of Cuyahoga Falls,
Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199-200 (2003) (ordering that disparate impact
claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs "abandoned " them without commenting on the appli
cability of disparate impact theories to the FHA); Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) ("Since appellants conceded the applicability of the disparate
impact test for evaluating the zoning ordinance under Title VIII, we do not reach the question
whether that test is the appropriate one. Without endorsing the precise analysis of the Court of Ap
peals, we are satisfied on this record that disparate impact was shown . . . . ").
123.
See, e.g., Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction,
Fair Housing and Lending law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 411
(1998) (describing the standard as "sketchy and haphazard ").
124.

See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977).

125.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)( l )(A) (2000). Several FHA cases were decided between the
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and the rein
statement of the "business necessity " test by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. These cases
apply the more lenient "business justification " test of Wards Cove. However, these cases should not
be given weight, as courts deciding FHA claims after 1991 have agreed that the "business necessity "
test applies. John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the Question of
Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 186-87 (2002).
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Even if the practice is justified by business necessity, the defendant is still
liable if a less discriminatory alternative exists.
There is substantial support for this type of test among the courts. Sev
126
Courts that have adopted the

eral circuits have used this precise test.

alternative formulation agree that the primary considerations are ( 1 ) the ex
istence of a discriminatory effect that is (2) not justified by a legitimate
127
business necessity.
As such, all circuits that have analyzed disparate im
128
FH
pact under the
A agree with the basic precepts of the test.
The position of the Seventh Circuit further indicates the similarity of the
tests. The Seventh Circuit introduced a different disparate impact test in Ar
1 30
29
lington Heights, 1 one of the first disparate impact cases under the FHA.
The circuit has since adopted the test described above, explaining that "[t]he
analysis [in A rlington Heights] was in fact though not in words the 'dispa
131
The other courts

rate impact' analysis familiar from Title VII cases."

applying the Arlington Heights test have not had the opportunity to revisit
1 32

their rulings in light of the Seventh Circuit's subsequent analysis.

1 26. See Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. v. Town of Huntington, 3 1 6 F.3d 357, 366 (2d Cir.
2003); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49-50 ( 1 st Cir. 2000); Harris v. Itzhaki, 1 83
F.3d 1 043, 105 1 (9th Cir. 1 999) (explaining that "[w]e apply Title VII discrimination analysis in
examining Fair Housing Act discrimination claims," although the decision was ultimately based on a
finding of discriminatory intent) (quoting Gamble v. City of Escondido, 1 04 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir.
1 997))); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1 250-51 (I 0th Cir. 1995); Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 1 48-49; United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1 1 79,
1 1 84-85 (8th Cir. 1974); Owens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV- 1 1 84-H, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1 5701 , at *49-50 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005). The Eighth Circuit did not mention the policy
and causation elements, requiring only that "the conduct of the defendant actually or predictably
results in racial discrimination." However, that case considered a zoning ordinance, so the policy
and causation elements were clear. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1 1 84.
1 27.

Stanton, supra note 1 25 , at 1 86.

Other circuits, although recognizing disparate impact under the FHA, have not had occa
1 28.
sion to formulate precise tests, see Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1 546, 1555 (5th Cir.
1 996); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 2 1 F.3d 1 5 3 1 , 1 543 ( ! I th Cir. 1 994); Hanson v. Veterans
Admin., 800 F.2d 1 3 8 1 , 1 389 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding inadequate proof of causation and not discuss
ing the burden-shifting portion of the test), although a lower court in the Fifth Circuit has adopted
the Title VII test, Owens, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 570 1 , at *49-50.
1 29.
1977).

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1 283, 1 290 (7th Cir.

1 30. The Seventh Circuit found four factors to be relevant in determining whether disparate
impact was present:
( 1 ) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is there some evidence of
discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington
v. Davis; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does
the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of mi
nority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property
owners who wish to provide such housing.

Id. Finding only the first and fourth factors present, the court called it a "close case" and decided in
favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1 290--93.
131.

Viii. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1 52 1 , 1533 (7th Cir. 1 990).

1 32. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1 055, 1 065 (4th Cir. 1982); Arthur v. City of
Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1 986) (adopting three of the four factors but declining to con
sider intent).
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B. Application of the FHA Disparate Impact
Standard to Insurance
The language and history of the FHA support the application of its dis
parate impact test to claims of discrimination in insurance. The "because of
race" clause in § 3604 applies equally to the sale or rental of a home and to
other actions, such as insurance policies, that "make unavailable or deny" a
133
home. Similarly, § 3605 makes discrimination "because of race" illegal in
"transactions" and defines that term to include lending and "providing other
13 4
financial assistance." Courts have held that the disparate impact standard
135
applies to the other activities covered under§ 3604 and§ 3605. Given the
137
13 6
integrality of insurance and housing and the broad goals of the FHA, it
makes little sense to carve out an exception to the disparate impact standard
for insurance.
Judicial decisions support the conclusion that the FHA applies to insur
ance policies with disparate impacts. Although no circuit court has
considered a disparate impact challenge to insurance policy under the
138
FHA, the broad language used to describe the applicability of the dispa
rate impact standard does not suggest a distinction between insurance and
139
other practices. When considering other suits under the FHA, courts have
agreed that "[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone [under the FHA]
. . . because . . . 'the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous
and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a will
140
ful scheme.' "
Moreover, the three district courts that have considered
disparate impact challenges to insurance practices have seen no reason to
141
exempt insurance from the disparate impact test.

1 33.

42 u.s.c. § 3604 (2000) .

1 34.

Id. § 3605.

1 35. See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1 546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1 995) (loans);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1 1 79, 1 1 84 (8th Cir. 1974) (rental).
1 36.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

1 37.

See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.

The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have both avoided ruling on disparate impact insurance
1 38.
discrimination cases. Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003) (addressing only the
McCarran-Ferguson preemption issue on interlocutory appeal prior to the settlement of the case);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1 35 1 , 1 363 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that, in the ab
sence of a specific HUD regulation on the applicability of the disparate impact test to insurance, the
question was not ripe for review, but finding against the insurance companies on disparate treatment
grounds).
1 39.
See, e.g., Simms, 83 F.3d at 1555 (holding that a "violation of the FHA may be estab
lished . . . by a showing of significant discriminatory effect" without any language limiting the
holding to certain types of violations).
140.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1 1 85 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 , 497
(D.D.C. 1 967)).
141.
Owens v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV- 1 1 84-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1 570 1 , at *49-50 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005); Nat'I Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D.D.C. 2002); Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94
Ohio Misc. 2d 1 5 1 (Ohio C.P. 1 997).
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Insurance companies maintain that the process of adverse selection in
the insurance industry raises unique concerns, making a disparate impact
142
test inappropriate for insurance.
Insurance is priced based on the average
143
risk of loss in the pool of insureds. Insurers argue that insurance pricing is
most effective when insureds can be pooled into groups whose members
144
share "similar characteristics." If risk levels were not similar among mem
bers of a pool, those whose risk levels were less than average for the pool
would drop out rather than subsidize higher-risk members. This would in
crease the price of insurance for the remaining insured and decrease the
profit for the insurance company. If left unchecked, this adverse selection
would result in a "death spiral," in which only the highest-risk individuals
would be willing to buy insurance, and the insurance market would "im
145
plode."
Insurers argue that minority neighborhoods, particularly those in
the inner city, are especially risky to insure because of high crime rates, poor
146
services, and aging dwellings. If these factors were not taken into account,
people in lower-risk neighborhoods would have to pay increased premiums
to subsidize the costs of insuring high-risk, minority neighborhoods. This
would result in raising prices beyond expected losses in low-risk neighbor
hoods,

causing everyone

who does not live in a high-risk minority
147

neighborhood to drop their insurance coverage.

The Fourth Circuit agreed with the insurance companies that, due to
these special policy concerns, insurance cannot be lumped in with "other
148
services" within the meaning of the FHA. The court found that, due to the
special problem of adverse selection in insurance, the FHA does not apply
149
even where insurers expressly consider race in underwriting decisions.
B ecause of the special considerations in the insurance business, the court
argued, Congress would not have made discrimination in homeowners in
150
The Seventh Circuit, while

surance unlawful without special discussion.

applying the FHA to insurance disparate treatment, also suggested that the

142. Although insurers make similar arguments against the application of the FHA to dis
criminatory treatment, the Mackey court is the only court ever to find the argument compelling in
the discriminatory treatment context. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 4 1 9 (4th Cir. 1 984).
1 43.

Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 4.

144.

NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1 992).

145.
Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 1 1 3
L.J. 1 223, 1254 (2004).

YALE

146.

Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 9.

147.

Id. at 5.

148.

Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 4 1 9, 423 (4th Cir. 1 984).

149.

Id.

1 50.
Id. This argument should fail when applied to direct racial discrimination. The insurance
industry does not require insurers to "engage in disparate treatment, to draw lines on the basis of
race rather than risk." NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 298 (7th Cir. 1 992). As
Judge Easterbrook observed, "[r]isk discrimination is not race discrimination." Id. at 290. Prejudice
would undermine, not improve, the accuracy of insurance pricing. To the extent that the success of
the insurance business relies on accurate risk assessment, refusal to follow the FHA's ban on dispa
rate treatment would harm the insurance industry.
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nature of the insurance industry makes disparate impact analysis inappropri
151
ate.
Empirical evidence undermines this argument. Low-risk individuals do
not reduce their coverage when placed in insurance pools with higher-risk
.
.
153
152
. because, first, peop1e are very poor at ca1 cu1atmg
msureds. Th'IS IS
.
nsk .
The particularly high information and search costs relating to insurance ex
154
acerbate the impact of this weakness on insurance decisions.
As a result,
low-risk individuals, who could logically remove themselves from the in
surance pool, will not recognize that they are paying more than their
155
Second, the risk-averse are typically both more likely to
156
buy insurance and less expensive to insure than others. This is because, in

optimum rate.

addition to purchasing insurance, these "belt-and-suspenders types" will
157
Since customers who are inex

take further steps to reduce their own risk.

pensive to insure will not abandon the insurance market, insurers may not
need special treatment under the FHA.
Moreover, even if insurance companies do need to be able to differentiate
among risk categories to some extent, they need not be exempt from disparate
impact liability. If the insurance industry actually requires the use of a particu
lar indicator in order to operate profitably, it will prevail under the business
158
necessity test. In a recent case, one district court applied a disparate impact
test to insurance, dismissing the argument that insurance companies should
not be held liable for disparate impact as "unavailing in light of the availabil
159
ity of the 'business justification' defense."
In a similar case decided under
Ohio state law, a court found that "the disparate-impact approach does not
unduly undermine the business of selling insurance. Assuming . . . that the

151.

Am. Family , 978 F.2d at 290.

1 52.

Siegelman, supra note 145, at 1 248.

1 53. Id. at 1 241 -46 (surveying studies that demonstrate human inability to calculate their own
risk of loss).
154.

Squires, supra note 2 1 , at 76.

1 55.

Id.

1 56. Siegelman, supra note 145, at 1 270-74 (surveying studies that demonstrate propitious
selection, rather than adverse selection, in insurance). For example, people who buy life insurance
live longer than those who do not, even after controlling for factors such as income and smoking
status. Id. at 1 270.
1 57. Id. at 1 266; see also Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, P rivate Information and Its
Effect on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance 3, 30 (Nat'! Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9957, 2003), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w9957.pdf (finding that more cautious individuals are more likely to have long-term care insurance
and less likely to enter a nursing home because they are more likely to seek preventative care).
1 58. Cf Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 F. Supp. 1 330, 1 34 1 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (approv
ing use of a loan-to-value ratio in underwriting decisions as a legitimate business criterion, even
though it makes loans unavailable on low-value, inner-city homes).
159. Nat'! Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 60
(D.D.C. 2002).
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insurance industry is based on 'fair' risk discrimination, the disparate
160
impact approach will not impede such fair discrimination."
The fact that circuit courts have held other financial services providers
161
Lenders are

liable for disparate impacts further supports this conclusion.

similar to insurers in that both are concerned about the risk associated with
their investment and look for accurate indicators of that risk. Although some
have argued that the insurance industry must be free to discriminate based
162
this is no less true for the credit industry. Therefore, since lenders
163
are liable for disparate impacts, there is no reason to exempt insurers.
on risk,

C. Burden of Proof in the Disparate Impact

Test for Insurance under the FHA
Courts disagree about who bears the burden of showing the absence of a
discriminatory alternative, the final step of the disparate impact test. Some
borrow from Title VII and hold that once the defendant has shown a busi
ness necessity, the burden should shift back to the plaintiff to rebut the
defendant's evidence by showing that a less discriminatory alternative ex
164
ists.
Others require that the defendant show the lack of a less
165
discriminatory alternative as part of the showing of business necessity.
These courts argue that the Title VII test is inappropriate in the Title VIII
166
Title VII's burden shifting is justified only by the need for em

context.

ployers to pick the best person for job, a concern not relevant when selecting
167
a tenant.

160. Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 5 1 , 1 57 (Ohio
C.P. 1 997).
161.

See, e.g., Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 8 3 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1 995).

1 62.

See, e.g. , P rudential Ins., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 60.

163. This is particularly true in today's economy, since many companies provide both loans
and insurance to their customers. Many insurers even have mortgage lenders as subsidiaries. Wil
liam C. Apgar & Mark Duda, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act:
Past Accomplishments and Future Regulatory Challenges, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. EcoN. Pot.. R.
169, 1 83 (2003). However, the application of disparate impact to credit continues to be controversial
because it is believed to interfere with the assessment of credit risk. See generally Mahoney, supra
note 1 23.
164. See Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 87 1 , 883-84 (8th Cir. 2003);
Mountain Side Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1 243, 1254 (10th Cir.
1995) (applying the Title VII standard without discussion of possible differences in the Title VIlI
context).
165. See Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. v. Town of Huntington, 3 1 6 F.3d 357, 366 (2d Cir.
2003); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 1 26, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
166. See, e.g.. Riv.a, 564 F.2d at 148-49 (differentiating Title VIl cases and placing the bur
den of proving that no less discriminatory alternative exists on the defendant in FHA cases because
the qualities that employers may legitimately consider are more easily defined than those in the
housing context, and because "the consequences of an error in admitting a tenant do not seem nearly
as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in hiring an unqualified airline pilot" (quot
ing Elliot M. Mincberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII P rima Facie Case to Title Vlll Litigation,
1 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 28, 174 ( 1 976))).
167.

Id.
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It is appropriate to place the burden on the insurer-defendant in Title
168
VIII insurance discrimination cases. Not only does the Title VII justifica
tion not apply, but placing the burden on the defendant is justified in this
context because only the insurer has access to data on the details of, and
169
justifications for, its pricing models.
Moreover, insurance companies rou
tinely destroy data on rejected claims, making it particularly onerous for
110
plaintiffs to prove discrimination.
Since the defendant has sole access to
171
the evidence, the defendant should also bear the burden of proof.
Notwithstanding the protection afforded insurers by the business neces
sity test, insurance companies argue that placing the burden of proof on the
insurance company effectively makes the business necessity defense un
available. Insurance companies claim that requiring them to maintain
information justifying the business necessity of each factor used in under
writing would be

frohibitively expensive and damaging to the entire
17
insurance industry.
Although the data may not be easy for insurers to

gather, they have much more ready access to this information than do their
173
customers. If accurate classification of risk is as important to the insurance
business as insurers claim, it seems unlikely that insurers would rely on risk
assessment factors without knowing how these factors actually correlate to
risk. If, in fact, insurers are not maintaining this information, the business
174
necessity requirement may aid them in improving their pricing models.

III . APPLICATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT TEST
TO SPECIFIC INSURANCE POLICIES

Many insurance pricing mechanisms disproportionately impact minori
ties. This Part applies the disparate impact test to insurers' use of age and
value requirements, territory rating, and subjective factors such as good
housekeeping and pride of ownership. Section III.A concludes that use of
these policies establishes a prima facie disparate impact case. Section III.B
considers the applicability of the business necessity defense in this context.

168. See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 1 25, at 1 84 (arguing that defendants are due less deference
in Title VIII cases than in Title VII cases because there is less need for the defendant to make fine
distinctions between applicants; employers may be harmed by not hiring the best person for the job,
but these considerations do not apply in the housing context).
169.
William E. Murray, Homeowners Insurance Redlining: the Inadequacy of Federal Reme
dies and the Future ofthe P roperty Insurance War, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 735, 744-45 ( 1997-98).
170.

Id.

1 7 1 . This i s comparable to the justification of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Cf Byrne v.
Boadle, 1 59 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Exch. Div. 1863) (placing the burden of proof on the defendant
because "how could [the plaintiff] possibly ascertain from what cause it occurred?").
172.

Detlefsen, supra note 20, at 38-39.

173.

See supra notes 169- 1 70 and accompanying text.

174.
Cf Squires, supra note 21, at 76 (arguing that "[r]esearch on the causes of urban prop
erty losses . . . could further help insurers to improve the efficiency and fairness of their pricing
systems and underwriting criteria.").
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A. Elements of a Prima Facie Case of Disparate Impact
Establishing the first two elements of a prima facie case (the existence
of specific policies and racial differences) is straightforward. Insurance
companies have specific policies on the above-mentioned factors. A recent
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) report demon
strates the existence of a disparate impact with its finding that low-income,
urban, minority homeowners are charged more for insurance and have fewer
175
Therefore, this Section concentrates on the third ele

options than others.
ment: causation.

Proving that the maximum-age and minimum-value requirements cause
a disparate impact should not be difficult, given the correlation between race
and class. Researchers have found that minorities are more likely than
176
whites to live in old homes. This is not surprising, as a higher percentage
177
of blacks than whites live in poverty. It is common sense that poor people
are more likely than others to buy inexpensive homes. In most areas, these
178
inexpensive homes are likely to be old.
Furthermore, since white-flight
'79
remains common,
even middle-class blacks tend to live in less expensive
180
homes than whites with equivalent incomes.
Nationally, homes belonging
to black homeowners are worth 1 8% less, on average, than homes owned by
181
Some insurance companies
white homeowners with the same incomes.
have already eliminated maximum-age and minimum-value requirements, in
182
recognition of their vulnerability to suit.
Territorial rating practices should also be found to have a disparate im
183
The specific factors considered by insurance companies, such as the

pact.

number of owner-occupied homes in an area, the number of vacant build
ings in an area, the crime rate, and the quality of municipal services, all vary
1 75 .

Otis, Urban Gap, supra note 28, at 3 .

1 76.

Squires, supra note 2 1 , at 1 1 .

1 77.

CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL.,

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PuBL'N No. P60-226, INCOME,
2003, at 9 (2004), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf (finding that the poverty rate among blacks
was 24.4 percent in 2003, compared with 8.2 percent among whites).
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:

1 78.
MEYER, supra note 1 0 1 , at 8. As urban areas grow, upper- and middle-income residents
typically move into new homes on the urban periphery. ANTHONY DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 38-39 ( 1 981). The value of older homes left behind in the center is de
pressed by the availability of new homes on the periphery, and these homes are occupied by poor
households. Id.
179.

MEYER,

1 80.

Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 58.

supra note 1 0 1 , at 2 1 8- ! 9.

1 8 1 . Id. For every dollar of income, white owners had $2.64 worth of house. Black owners
had $2. 1 6 worth of house. Id.
1 82.

L.H.

Otis, Top Carriers Make Moves in Urban Market, 100 NAT'L UNDERWRITER: PROP.

& CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. ED. I ( 1996). The use of maximum age has been replaced

with other indicators such as the condition of roof and the age of wiring, furnace, and plumbing.
Barbara Bowers, Redeveloping the Urban Market, 99 BEST'S REv. 1 1 , 32 (1 999); see also Stanton,
supra note 1 25, at 176 (discussing the use of lead paint as a proxy for age of home).
1 83. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing specific territorial rating
policies).
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184
between i nner ci ty and suburban areas. These factors have a di sp arate i m
1 5
p act because resi denti al segregati on is sti ll common, 8 and mi nori ty
18 6
homeowners are more li kely than whi tes to own homes in i nner- ci ty areas.
P erhap s because i nsurers recogniz e the vulnerabi li ty of these fa ctors to
di sp arate i mp act challenges, they have begun to rate terri tori es based solely
187
on the amount that the i nsurer has p ai d out in clai ms from that area.
To
establi sh that thi s typ e of terri tori al rati ng has a di sp arate i mp act, i t i s neces
sary

to

access

the

terri tori al

rati ngs

used

by i nsurance

comp ani es.

U nfo rtunately, li mi ted data are avai lable on thi s p oi nt because i nsurance
188
p ri ci ng models have been p rotected as trade secrets. If minori ty areas re
cei ve more exp ensi ve terri tori al rati ngs than whi te areas, such rati ngs would
have a di sp arate i mp act.
The use of subj ecti ve factors in determini ng ri sk may support raci al di s
criminati on because i t allows i nsurance agents to act out thei r own bi ases.
Although no comp rehensi ve research has been done, there have been i ndi ca
ti ons that agent bi as has some effect. For i nstance, one study of homeowners
i nsurance p ayments, followin g a hurri cane in Flori da, suggested that lan
guage and cultural barri ers make assessors less likely to trust L ati no
189
i nsureds. Insurers are also more li kely to requi re comp rehensi ve i nsp ec
190
ti on of homes in non- whi te nei ghborhoods.
Agent bi as has also been
i ndi cated by i nsurers' reluctance to market i nsurance in urban areas, even
where they stand to p rofit. For examp le, in Mi ssouri , the average commi s
si on p er agent i s $25,891 in areas wi th the hi ghest mi nority p op ulati on,
1 91
comp ared to $3,08 1 i n the areas wi th smallest mi nority p op ulati on. Insurer

1 84. For example, in 2004, 53. l % of people in central cities owned their homes, compared to
75.7% of suburban residents. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual04/ann04t12.html (last visited May 17, 2006).
Crime rates in inner-city areas typically exceed those in suburban areas. In 2003, for example, an
urban home was half again as likely as a suburban home to be burglarized, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Victimization Rates by Type of Crime and Locality of Residence, http://
www.ojp.usdoj .gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/cv0353.pdf (last visited May 17, 2006), and black,
urban heads of household were twice as likely as white, suburban heads of household to be victims
of burglary. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Victimization Rates By Locality of Residence, Race of
Head of Household and Type of Crime, http:!/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/
cv0355.pdf (last visited May 17, 2006).
1 85.

See MEYER, supra note 1 0 1 , at 1 1 .

1 86.

Brookings, Housing Policy, supra note 6, at 56.

1 87.

Supra note 22.

1 88. The California Supreme Court recently ordered State Farm to release the number of
policies issued and canceled by zip code. In doing so, the court rejected the argument that these data
should be protected as trade secrets, on grounds that the intent of Proposition 1 03 was to override
trade secret claims. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 32 Cal. 4th 1 029, 1 046-47 (2004).
This decision suggests the potential for providing access to additional information.
1 89. Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net?: Home Insurance and Inequity, 2 1
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 229, 254 ( 1 996). This study also found indications that insurance companies
pay men more in damages than they pay women. Id. at 253.
190.

Murray, supra note 1 69, at 737.

191.

Squires, supra note 2 1 , a t 88.

Michigan Law Review

2016

[Vol. 104: 1993

bias could explain the unwillingness of agents to move into urban areas until
192

this differential is equalized.
Since

1996, a few lower courts have recognized that the above

mentioned policies cause sufficient disparate impact to support a prima facie
case under the FHA. The D.C. District Court denied the defendant's sum
mary judgment motion in a case challenging the use of ( 1) age, market
value, and the difference between market value and replacement cost,
(2) territorial rating zones that "reflect" racial composition, and (3) the use
193
In a similar case, an Ohio state court found sufficient

of credit ratings.

evidence that using these factors is discriminatory to deny the insurer's mo
194
Both cases subsequently settled, with the

tion for summary judgment.

insurance company agreeing to discontinue use of these factors and to in
195
These outcomes provide further evidence

crease marketing in urban areas.

of the causal link between these insurance practices and the disparate impact
on minorities.
B. The Business Necessity Defense
The above-mentioned insurance policies are legal, in spite of their dispa
196
The burden rests on the

rate impact, if justified by business necessity.

insurer to show that the metrics used to measure risk are predictive of loss.
The insurer should also bear the burden of showing that the metrics used are
197
better predictors of loss than other available metrics.
For example, an in
surer using the age of the home in underwriting and pricing decisions would
have to provide data showing both that the age of a home is an accurate pre
dictor of risk and that more specific indicators, such as the age of the wiring
and plumbing, would not be more accurate.
The limited data available suggest that the use of factors that result in
higher insurance rates for high minority areas may exceed what may be
198
justified by business necessity.
An analysis of data available in

1 92.

Id. at 74.

193.
Nat'! Fair Hous. Alliance Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49
(D.D.C. 2002). The court accepted, for the purposes of the 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiffs' allegation
that these policies were "not justified or supported by business necessity . . . and [that] less restric
tive, non-discriminatory alternatives [were] available to meet any legitimate business objectives." Id.
at 50.
194.
Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 5 1 (Ohio C.P.
1 997) (considering a disparate impact insurance claim under provisions of the Ohio Civil Rights Act
similar to HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(d)(4) (2005)).
1 95. Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 86, 1 95-203
(Ohio C.P. 1 998).
196.

See supra note 1 25 and accompanying text.

1 97.

See supra Section II.C.

1 98. NAIC and the Missouri Department of Insurance have made public limited information
which suggests insurance companies pay out the most per dwelling in neighborhoods where more
than half of the residents are minorities. Interestingly, the data also show that loss costs are lowest in
integrated neighborhoods (with minority populations of four to fifty percent). Squires, supra note
2 1 , at 58.
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199
M issouri
show s that, although homeow ners in minority areas pay higher
200
insurance r ates than others, the ratio of losses paid by the insur ance com
pany to premiums paid by the insured is actually low er in high-mi nority
areas (.73 compared to . 8 1). This indicates that residents of minor ity areas
2 01
The one national study on point, a

are overcharged fo r their insur ance.

1 994 study of insur ance data by rating terr itory done by N AIC, suggests that
these differences are not unique to M issour i. The study concluded that
"residents of low -income and minority neighborhoods face greater diffi culty
in obtaining high-quality homeow ners insurance coverage" and pay more
202
fo r that coverage. The NAIC report determined that the insur ance industry
203
had not provided loss-cost data to j ustify these differences.
I n all metropolitan areas fo r w hich data are available, the average insur
ance pr emi um is substanti ally higher in neighborhoods w here more than
half of the residents are mi nor ities than it is in neighborhoods w here few er
204
than thr ee per cent of the residents are minorities. This is true even w hen
2°5
controlling for neighborhood income leveI .
In high-income w hite areas,
206
premiums aver age 53% of those paid _in high-income, high-minority areas.
Similarly, residents of low -income w hite areas pay only 54% of the premi
207
ums paid by residents of low- income, minority areas.
The difference is
slightly less star k in medium-income ar eas, w here residents of w hite
208
The

neighborhoods pay 72% as much as residents in high- minority areas.

claim that these differ ences in pricing are needed to cover higher costs has
not been substantiated by the M issouri data and the N AIC r eport.
CONCLUSION

W hen insurance policies function to make insur ance more expensive in
urban areas w ith large minority populations, the impacts are fe lt not only by
the individual homeow ners, but by broader society as w ell. L ack of insur
ance provides further j ustif ication fo r w hite flight, because lack of insurance

199. Missouri is the only state that has maintained comprehensive data on losses and premi
ums by zip code over a long period. Id. at 53. Unfortunately, national data are not currently
available.
200.
Homeowners in high minority areas pay higher insurance rates than others, averaging
$5.06 per thousand dollars of insurance, compared to $4.37 in areas where fewer than three percent
of the residents are minorities. Id. at 59.
20 1 .

Id. The difference is even greater for limited coverage insurance plans. Id.

202.

Otis, Urban Gap, supra note 28, at 3.

203.

Id.

204.

Squires, supra note 2 1 , at 56.

205.

Id.

206.

Id.

207.

Id.

208.

Id.
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209
in minority areas will make houses unmarketable. It hastens the deteriora
tion of slums because landlords cannot invest in their properties, nor can
purchasers buy empty buildings, without insurance. As The President's Na
tional Advisory Panel explained 38 years ago:
Insurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of credit.
Without insurance, banks and other financial institutions will not-and
cannot-make loans. New housing cannot be constructed, and existing
housing cannot be repaired. New businesses cannot be opened, and exist
ing businesses expand, or even survive.
Without insurance, buildings are left to deteriorate; services, goods, and
jobs diminish. Efforts to rebuild our nation's inner cities cannot move for
210
ward. Communities without insurance are communities without hope.

209. The "(d]iscriminatory denial of access to 'normal' insurance and relegation of minorities
to state FAIR plans creates 'the racially segregated housing patterns' which the Fair Housing Act is
designed to prevent." Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1 106,
1 1 1 1-12 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
2 1 0.

ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 16, at I.

